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I. Introduction  
The Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) 
published in 2010 the “total maximum daily load” (“TMDL”) 
of nitrogen, phosphorous, and sediment that can be released 
into the Chesapeake Bay (the “Bay”) to comply with the 
Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 et seq..  The TMDL is a 
comprehensive framework for pollution reduction designed to 
“restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological 
integrity” of the Bay, 33 U.S.C. § 1251, the subject of much 
ecological concern over several decades. 
Trade associations with members who will be affected 
by the TMDL’s implementation—the American Farm Bureau 
Federation, the National Association of Home Builders, and 
other organizations for agricultural industries that include 
fertilizer, corn, pork, and poultry operations (collectively, 
“Farm Bureau”)—sued.  They allege that all aspects of the 
TMDL that go beyond an allowable sum of pollutants (i.e., 
the most nitrogen, phosphorous, and sediment the Bay can 
safely absorb per day) exceeded the scope of the EPA’s 
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authority to regulate, largely because the agency may intrude 
on states’ traditional role in regulating land use. 
The District Court ruled against Farm Bureau, and it 
appeals.  For the reasons that follow, we side with the EPA 
and affirm the District Court’s ruling. 
II. Background 
The EPA and seven states—Virginia, West Virginia, 
Maryland, Delaware, Pennsylvania, New York, and the 
District of Columbia, which is a “state” for Clean Water Act 
purposes, 33 U.S.C. § 1362(3)—have engaged in a decades-
long process to develop a plan to improve the quality of the 
water in the Chesapeake Bay, the largest estuary in North 
America.  The Bay’s watershed area of 64,000 square miles 
contains tens of thousands of lakes, rivers, streams and 
creeks.  The Bay itself has a surface area of 4,500 square 
miles, and it has 11,684 miles of shoreline, longer than the 
coastline from San Diego, California to Seattle, Washington. 
A. The Chesapeake Bay, 1608–1972 
Before Europeans settled the Bay, it supported much 
sea life.  As two associates of John Smith wrote, “Neither 
better fish more plenty or variety had any of us ever seene, in 
any place swimming in the water, then in the bay of 
Chesapeack.”  Walter Russell & Anas Todkill et al., The 
Accidents that Happened in the Discoverie of the Bay, in 1 
The Complete Works of Captain John Smith (1580–1631)  
Philip L. Barbour, ed., 224, 228 (1986).  The fertile land of 
the watershed and the beauty and commercial value of the 
Bay proved attractive.  By 1950 about 7,000,000 people lived 
in the watershed; today it is home to 17,000,000, and by 2030 
the population may reach 20,000,000. 
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The watershed area not only sustains its growing 
human population; it also supports a great deal of commerce, 
including fishing, shipping, farming, and tourism.  All these 
activities, as well as other incidents of daily life, contribute 
pollutants to the Bay.  As a result, it is plagued by dead zones 
with opaque water and algae blooms that render significant 
parts of it unable to support aquatic life.  Surrounding 
jurisdictions recognize that the Bay absorbs far too much 
nitrogen, phosphorous, and sediment to be the healthy 
ecosystem it once was.  These threats to the Bay (and to the 
livelihood of many who depend on its bounty) have been 
known for a long time both to scientists and to observant lay 
people.  As a Pulitzer-Prize winning chronicler of Bay life put 
it: 
Coliform bacteria indices, atomic plant pass-
throughs, siltation-caused reduced 
photosynthetic capabilities, oxygen deprivation, 
nutrient loading and the doubling rate . . . I 
doubted many watermen understood the full 
threat of their quiet and insidious workings.  
Perhaps it was easier to put it the way they do.  
You look hard at the water and sometimes it 
seems like it’s getting a little old and tired, a 
little messy.  Simple as that, if anyone cares to 
notice. 
William W. Warner, Beautiful Swimmers: Watermen, Crabs 
and the Chesapeake Bay 273–74 (1976).1  
                                              
1 Warner wrote in the afterword to the 1994 edition of his 
book, “There is . . . no doubt that the Bay’s natural resources 
have seriously eroded since” Beautiful Swimmers was first 
published.  William W. Warner, Beautiful Swimmers: 
Watermen, Crabs and the Chesapeake Bay 293 (1994). 
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B. The Clean Water Act, 1972 
Congress took official note that the waters of the 
United States, including the Bay, needed protection and 
rescue.  In 1972, it passed major revisions to federal water 
pollution legislation known as the Clean Water Act.  Under 
that law, the EPA and the states participate in a “cooperative 
federalism” framework working together to clean the 
Nation’s waters.   
We deal primarily with one provision of this complex 
statute, which calls for the establishment of a “total maximum 
daily load” of pollution for certain waters.  33 U.S.C. 
§ 1313(d)(1)(C).2  The parties dispute what those words 
mean.  They are not defined in the Act, but the EPA has 
interpreted them to require publication of a comprehensive 
framework for pollution reduction in a given body of water.  
When we discuss this comprehensive document, we refer to it 
by the acronym “TMDL”; by contrast, when we analyze the 
statutory text, we refer to the words “total maximum daily 
load.” 
The Act provides that states set a total maximum daily 
load, and the EPA approves or disapproves it.  If the EPA 
disapproves, it must create the TMDL itself.  In this case, the 
Chesapeake Bay watershed jurisdictions agreed that they 
                                              
2 As in many areas of the law, specialized practitioners refer 
to the uncodified sections of provisions in the Statutes at 
Large.  The parties thus, for example, cite the Clean Water 
Act § 303(d)(1)(C) as the total maximum daily load 
provision.  Unless otherwise noted, we cite the law by 
reference to the U.S. Code, as we find those volumes easier to 
navigate than the Statutes at Large. 
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would not submit TMDLs, and the EPA would do so in the 
first instance.   
To understand the parties’ arguments, we consider the 
statutory context in which the words “total maximum daily 
load” arise.  The Clean Water Act does not simply direct the 
publication of the TMDL; it is one step in a process with 
several layers, each placing primary responsibility for 
pollution controls in state hands with “backstop authority” 
vested in the EPA.  TMDLs happen after a state enacts 
pursuant to its law (but required by the Clean Water Act) 
“water quality standards.”  The state designates a use for each 
relevant water (e.g., recreation or fishing) and sets a target 
water quality based on that use.  Id. § (c)(1) & (2).  The EPA 
must approve or disapprove the water quality standards.  If 
the latter, it must promulgate its own water quality standard 
for the state.  33 U.S.C. § 1313(a)(3)(A)–(C) & (b).   
Once water quality standards are in effect, the EPA 
and the states share responsibility for making sure that 
pollutants discharged into waters do not violate those 
standards.  Under the legislative and regulatory system for 
cleaning our Nation’s waters, pollution comes from “point” 
and “nonpoint” sources.  The former are discrete places 
where pollutants are discharged, like a drainpipe at a 
wastewater treatment plant, while the latter are diffuse 
sources of pollution, like farms or roadways, from which 
runoff drains into a watershed. 
The Clean Water Act gives the EPA primary 
responsibility for regulating point sources by establishing 
“effluent limitations,” 33 U.SC. § 1311(b)(1)(A), which are 
pollution caps that by statutory definition apply only to point 
sources.  Id. § 1362(11).  States in turn regulate nonpoint 
sources.  There is significant input and oversight from the 
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EPA, but it does not regulate nonpoint sources directly.  Id. 
§ 1329(b) & (e). 
Section 1313 anticipates that effluent limitations on 
point sources will be the front line of the defense against 
water pollution.  But, acknowledging that effluent limitations 
may not be enough, § 1313(d) requires the states to submit to 
the EPA a list of all bodies of water (or, by regulation, any 
segment of a body of water) for which effluent limitations 
and technology-based point source controls are insufficient to 
meet the applicable water quality standard.  These areas are 
known as “water quality limited segment[s],” 40 C.F.R. 
§ 131.3(h), and the list on which they appear often goes by 
the “Section 303(d) list” after the part of the uncodified Clean 
Water Act to which 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d) corresponds. 
Together with the Section 303(d) list, states must 
submit “total maximum daily loads” for those pollutants that 
cannot be brought to an acceptable level by point source 
controls.  33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(1)(A) & (C).  After a state 
submits its Section 303(d) list and TMDL, the EPA must 
approve or disapprove them; if it disapproves, it must create 
its own list and TMDL.  33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(2).   
To recap: states set water quality standards for the 
waters within their borders, and they must submit to the EPA 
a list of those waters for which point-source pollution 
limitations alone are not enough to make the water meet the 
applicable quality standard; for all the waters on that list, a 
state must submit a TMDL.  If the EPA disapproves a state 
submission, it takes responsibility for the unmet 
requirement(s).  As noted, for the Chesapeake Bay the 
relevant states and the EPA agreed that the EPA would draft 
the TMDL in the first instance. 
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This case primarily concerns the meaning of “total 
maximum daily load,” words that occur in the part of the 
Clean Water Act that requires states (or, in this case, the 
EPA) to: 
establish . . . the total maximum daily load[] for 
those pollutants which the Administrator 
identifies under section 1314(a)(2) of this title as 
suitable for such calculation. Such load shall be 
established at a level necessary to implement the 
applicable water quality standards with seasonal 
variations and a margin of safety which takes 
into account any lack of knowledge concerning 
the relationship between effluent limitations and 
water quality. 
33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(1)(C).  The Act directed states to include 
“total maximum daily load[s]” in their required “continuing 
planning process[es]” no later than February 15, 1973.  33 
U.S.C. § 1313(e)(2). 
C. Definition and Development of TMDLs, 1972–
 2000 
This deadline, it turns out, was overly optimistic, as 
both states and the EPA have been slow in establishing 
TMDLs.  See Oliver A. Houck, TMDLs, Are We There Yet?: 
The Long Road Toward Water Quality–Based Regulation 
under the Clean Water Act, 27 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 
10,391, 10,392–93 (1997).  The initial blame cannot be laid 
on the states because the statute explicitly requires “the 
Administrator” of the EPA to identify the pollutants to which 
the TMDL requirement would apply.  33 U.S.C. 
§ 1313(d)(1)(C).  In 1975 the EPA issued a regulation to 
define “total maximum daily load,” but even then “the 
Agency still had not identified those pollutants that would be 
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subject to TMDL development.”  Dianne K. Conway, TMDL 
Litigation: So Now What?, 17 Va. Envtl. L.J. 83, 98 (1997).  
It did so in 1978 and required states to submit TMDLs by 
June 1979. 
The EPA’s regulations define “total maximum daily 
load” as the sum of “waste load allocations” and “load 
allocations.”  40 C.F.R. § 130.2(i).  Also by regulatory 
definition, waste load allocations are pollutant loads that 
come from point sources; load allocations come from 
nonpoint sources.  40 C.F.R. § 130.2(g) & (h).3  The EPA 
applies these allocations to any pollutant that brings a body of 
water below an acceptable standard of cleanliness.  See 43 
Fed. Reg. 60,662 (Dec. 28, 1978) (identifying “all pollutants” 
as suitable for TMDL development). 
Once the EPA had laid out the required contents of 
TMDLs, it and the states remained tardy in establishing them.  
As a result, a wave of citizen-suits in the 1980s led to a 
consensus that a state’s failure to submit a TMDL should be 
deemed a “constructive submission” that no TMDL is needed, 
triggering the EPA’s duty to accept that conclusion or 
promulgate its own TMDL.  Kingman Park Civic Ass’n v. 
EPA, 84 F. Supp. 2d 1, 5 (D.D.C. 1999) (collecting cases).  
Even these successes did not spur immediate action, as courts 
initially would not follow the “constructive submission” 
theory “in cases brought against states which engaged in 
some level of TMDL activity, no matter how minute.”  
Conway, TMDL Litigation, 17 Va. Envtl. L.J. at 95.   
In the mid-1990s, nearly a quarter century past the 
Clean Water Act’s “deadline,” courts became frustrated with 
                                              
3 In the initial regulation defining TMDLs, the terms were 
different, but the EPA still required allocation between point 
and nonpoint sources.  40 Fed. Reg. 55,346 (Nov. 28, 1975). 
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the prevailing “wait-and-see” approach and directed states 
and the EPA to develop TMDLs with more dispatch.  See 
Sierra Club v. Hankinson, 939 F. Supp. 865 (N.D. Ga. 1996), 
939 F. Supp. 872 (N.D. Ga. 1996); Idaho Sportsmen’s 
Coalition v. Browner, 951 F. Supp. 962 (W.D. Wash. 1996).  
Following the success of these cases, “citizen-plaintiffs, 
imbued with the ecosystem consciousness, launched a tidal 
wave of lawsuits to force the EPA and the states to implement 
the TMDLs process.”  Michael M. Wenig, How “Total” Are 
“Total Maximum Daily Loads”?—Legal Issues Regarding 
the Scope of Watershed-Based Pollution Control Under the 
Clean Water Act, 12 Tul. Envtl. L.J. 87, 94 (1998).   
The lawsuits of the 1990s were followed by the actual 
drafting of thousands of TMDLs, which the EPA has 
described as “the technical backbone” of its approach to 
cleaning the Nation’s waters.  EPA Office of Water, Total 
Maximum Daily Load (TMDL) Program Draft TMDL 
Program Implementation Strategy § 1.2 (1996).  TMDLs are 
now thorough “informational tools that allow the states to 
proceed from the identification of waters requiring additional 
planning to the required plans.”  Pronsolino v. Nastri, 291 
F.3d 1123, 1129 (9th Cir. 2002).  TMDLs are not self-
executing, but they serve as the cornerstones for pollution-
reduction plans that do create enforceable rights and 
obligations.4 
                                              
4 The parties debate what precisely TMDLs are.  Our 
understanding of them as informational tools is supported by 
every case and piece of scholarship to consider them as well 
as the language of the Chesapeake Bay TMDL itself.  See 
City of Arcadia v. EPA, 411 F.3d 1103, 1105 (9th Cir. 2005); 
Sierra Club v. Meiburg, 296 F.3d 1021, 1025 (11th Cir. 2002) 
(“Each TMDL serves as the goal for the level of that pollutant 
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D. The Chesapeake Bay TMDL, 2000–2010  
Development of the Chesapeake Bay TMDL began in 
earnest with the Chesapeake 2000 Agreement, whereby the 
EPA and political backers from the Bay states made 
commitments geared to reducing pollution in the Bay.  This 
Agreement eventually gave way to states’ submission to the 
EPA of “Phase I Watershed Improvement Plans,” which were 
drafts proposing target pollutant limitations and how the 
                                                                                                     
in the waterbody to which that TMDL applies.”); Bravos v. 
Green, 306 F. Supp. 2d 48, 56 (D.D.C. 2004) (“EPA’s 
approval of a State’s TMDL does not translate into approval 
of the State’s implementation plan.”); City of Arcadia v. EPA, 
265 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 1144 (N.D. Cal. 2003) (“TMDLs 
established under Section 303(d)(1) of the CWA function 
primarily as planning devices and are not self-executing.”); 
Idaho Sportsmen’s Coal. v. Browner, 951 F. Supp. 962, 966 
(W.D. Wash. 1996) (“TMDL development in itself does not 
reduce pollution. It is only a step toward bringing [water 
quality limited segments] into compliance with water quality 
standards; TMDLs inform the design and implementation of 
pollution control measures.”); Corey Longhurst, Where Is the 
Point? Water Quality Trading’s Inability to Deal with 
Nonpoint Source Agricultural Pollution, 17 Drake J. Agric. L. 
175, 187 (2012); Jan G. Laitos & Heidi Ruckriegle, The 
Clean Water Act and the Challenge of Agricultural Pollution, 
37 Vt. L. Rev. 1033, 1054–57 (2013) (criticizing courts for 
the limited legal effect they have given to TMDLs); J.A. 1113 
(“The cornerstone of the accountability framework is the 
jurisdictions’ development of [Watershed Improvement 
Plans], which serve as roadmaps for how and when a 
jurisdiction plans to meet its pollutant allocations under the 
TMDL.”). 
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states would achieve them.  The EPA developed the 
Chesapeake Bay TMDL in reliance on these plans and did so 
only after approving the pollutant limitations and concluding 
that each state had given “reasonable assurance” of actually 
meeting the targets in its Watershed Improvement Plan.  
Several of the first drafts of the Phase I Watershed 
Improvement Plans did not provide reasonable assurance, 
whereupon the EPA conferred with the relevant jurisdictions, 
they revised their Plans, and the EPA incorporated those 
revisions.  It determined that the final draft Phase I Watershed 
Improvement Plans provided reasonable assurance in all 
respects save two sources of pollution (Pennsylvania urban 
stormwater and West Virginia agriculture), and it imposed a 
“backstop adjustment,” meaning that it will require greater 
reductions from point sources in Pennsylvania and West 
Virginia if those states cannot meet their projected load 
allocations.  The EPA also decided to provide a “backstop 
allocation” for New York because that jurisdiction proposed 
to discharge too much nitrogen and phosphorous; this will 
also require more stringent point-source limitations than New 
York proposed. 
After making these adjustments to the states’ 
Watershed Improvement Plans, the EPA incorporated them 
into the final Chesapeake Bay TMDL.  It is detailed, as it 
includes point- and nonpoint-source limitations on nitrogen, 
phosphorous, and sediment for 92 segments of the Bay 
identified as overpolluted and further allocates those limits to 
specific point sources and to nonpoint source sectors.  The 
TMDL sets target dates, anticipating that 60% of its proposed 
actions will be complete by 2017, with all pollution control 
measures in place by 2025.  The next step, yet to happen, is 
for the states to develop their Phase II Watershed 
Improvement Plans to implement the TMDL. 
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On December 29, 2010, the EPA promulgated the 
TMDL through the notice-and-comment rulemaking process 
of the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”).  See 5 U.S.C. 
§ 553.  Over 45 days, the EPA held 18 public meetings (at 
which 2,500 members of the public attended), and it received 
more than 14,000 comments.  It took these comments and 
meetings into account when publishing the final TMDL. 
E. Procedural Background, 2011–Present 
As discussed above, TMDLs have long been the 
subject of litigation.  Environmental groups continue to press 
the EPA to promulgate more stringent TMDLs.  E.g., Ctr. For 
Biological Diversity v. EPA, No. 13-cv-1866, 2015 WL 
918686 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 2, 2015).  Not to be left on the 
sidelines, commercial concerns took to the courts to air their 
grievances with the EPA—this time not for acting too slowly, 
but for acting at all.  Our case is of this most recent variety. 
In January 2011, Farm Bureau sued the EPA under the 
APA and the citizen-suit provision of the Clean Water Act.  It 
asserted that the EPA exceeded its statutory authority by 
including deadlines and allocations in the TMDL and by 
requiring “reasonable assurance” from the states in drafting 
that document.  The District Court granted summary 
judgment in favor of the EPA, and this appeal followed. 
III. Jurisdiction 
The District Court had jurisdiction under 5 U.S.C. 
§ 702 and 28 U.S.C. § 1331.  We have jurisdiction pursuant 
to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and our standard of review is de novo.  
Pastore v. Bell Tel. Co. of Pennsylvania, 24 F.3d 508, 511 (3d 
Cir. 1994). 
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The TMDL is yet unenforced against anyone, nor can 
it be until it is implemented as part of a state’s continuing 
planning process for managing water pollution, 33 U.S.C. 
§ 1313(e).  Thus, Farm Bureau’s standing to challenge the 
TMDL and the ripeness of this dispute are open to debate.  
The EPA does not challenge Farm Bureau’s standing on 
appeal, but we have a free-standing duty to determine our 
jurisdiction. 
A. Standing  
“To ensure the proper adversarial presentation, . . . a 
litigant must demonstrate that it has suffered a concrete and 
particularized injury that is either actual or imminent, that the 
injury is fairly traceable to the defendant, and that it is likely 
that a favorable decision will redress that injury.”  
Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 517 (2007) (emphases 
added).  The injury claimed by members of the trade 
associations comprising Farm Bureau is the certainty that 
they will incur compliance costs when the TMDL is 
implemented and enforcement mechanisms are put in place.  
Thus, even if the TMDL does not cause injury by itself, it will 
give way to requirements with which Farm Bureau will have 
to comply.  See 33 U.S.C. § 1313(e) (mandating TMDL’s 
incorporation into states’ “continuing planning process[es]”).  
Specifically, states’ continuing planning processes will, by 
operation of the Clean Water Act, impose on the sectors in 
which Farm Bureau operates more stringent nonpoint source 
pollutant limitations than currently in place.  See TMDL 
Appendix R.  These requirements will in turn cause 
compliance costs for Farm Bureau, a classic injury-in-fact.  
Danvers Motor Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 432 F.3d 286, 291 (3d 
Cir. 2005) (“While it is difficult to reduce injury-in-fact to a 
simple formula, economic injury is one of its paradigmatic 
forms.”). 
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Although there is a plausible argument that Farm 
Bureau’s injury is insufficiently particularized and too 
speculative, as we do not know precisely what form new 
regulations will take, it is akin to injuries the Supreme Court 
has found sufficient for standing.  Ass’n of Data Processing 
Serv. Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 152 (1970) 
(data processors have standing when regulation expanded 
number of institutions authorized to perform data processing, 
thus increasing competition in the field); Barlow v. Collins, 
397 U.S. 159, 164 (1970) (tenant-farmers had standing when 
new regulation effectively gave incentives to landlords to 
charge higher rents).  In general, regulated entities that assert 
likely economic injury have standing even before the 
challenged regulatory action fully takes effect.  See Sierra 
Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 733–34 (1972) (“[P]alpable 
economic injuries have long been recognized as sufficient to 
lay the basis for standing, with or without a specific statutory 
provision for judicial review.”)   
Fair traceability and redressability are easily met here.  
There is no doubt that the EPA promulgated the TMDL, and 
removing the parts to which Farm Bureau objects would 
substantially lighten its regulatory burden. 
B. Ripeness 
Similarly, a pre-enforcement challenge to a regulation 
is ripe where the issues presented are fit for judicial review 
and hardship to the parties would result without hearing the 
suit.  Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 149 (1967).  
Here the parties present a purely legal dispute on a well-
developed record about the EPA’s process of promulgating a 
TMDL.  Although the TMDL has yet to be incorporated into 
a state’s continuing planning process and enforced against 
any individual plaintiff, members of the trade associations 
will have reason to limit their discharge of pollutants in 
28 
 
anticipation of the TMDL’s implementation.  And it would 
impose hardship on the EPA and the states not to hear this 
dispute now because they are poised to spend more time, 
energy, and money in developing an implementation plan.  If 
there is something wrong with the TMDL, it is better to know 
now than later. 
As we have jurisdiction and the case is ripe, we 
proceed to the merits. 
IV. Merits 
Farm Bureau interprets the words “total maximum 
daily load” in the Clean Water Act, codified at 33 U.S.C. 
§ 1313(d)(1)(C), as unambiguous: a TMDL can consist only 
of a number representing the amount of a pollutant that can be 
discharged into a particular segment of water and nothing 
more.  Thus it argues that the EPA overstepped its statutory 
authority in drafting the Chesapeake Bay TMDL when the 
agency (1) included in the TMDL allocations of permissible 
levels of nitrogen, phosphorous, and sediment among 
different kinds of sources of these pollutants, (2) promulgated 
target dates for reducing discharges to the level the TMDL 
envisions, and (3) obtained assurance from the seven affected 
states that they would fulfill the TMDL’s objectives.  In Farm 
Bureau’s view, even if allocations, target dates, and 
reasonable assurance are useful in calculating the number that 
is the TMDL, the final document may not specify a 
distribution of pollutants from point and nonpoint sources or 
deadlines for meeting the target reductions in pollutant 
discharge, nor may the EPA in drafting the document obtain 
any assurance from states that they will meet the targets. 
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A. Framework for our Decision 
The parties agree that this case is governed by Chevron 
v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).  The mechanics of Chevron 
are familiar: at “Step One,” courts inquire “whether Congress 
has directly spoken to the precise question at issue.  If the 
intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for 
the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the 
unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.”  Id. at 842–43.  
In framing “the precise question at issue,” we ask “whether 
the statute unambiguously forbids the Agency’s 
interpretation.”  Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 217–18 
(2002).   When the intent of Congress is expressed 
ambiguously in some way relevant to the case at hand, courts 
proceed to “Step Two.”  There the agency’s interpretations 
“are given controlling weight unless they are arbitrary, 
capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.”  Chevron, 
467 U.S. at 844. 
Underlying Chevron’s framework is courts’ 
understanding that Congress sometimes uses ambiguous 
language to delegate a scope of authority (or a gap to fill) to 
an administrative agency charged with administering the 
ambiguous statute.  This has not always been clear, as 
Chevron itself offered a variety of justifications for its 
outcome, but “the [Supreme] Court over the last decade, 
beginning in United States v. Mead Corp., [533 U.S. 218 
(2001)], has explicitly re-grounded Chevron in congressional 
intent,” specifically, “intent to delegate.”  Abbe R. Gluck, 
What 30 Years of Chevron Teach Us About the Rest of 
Statutory Interpretation, 83 Fordham L. Rev. 607, 610 & n.7 
(2014) (footnotes omitted); Mead, 533 U.S. at 226–27 
(“[A]dministrative implementation of a particular statutory 
provision qualifies for Chevron deference when it appears 
that Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to 
make rules carrying the force of law, and that the agency 
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interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in the 
exercise of that authority.”).  Four years after Mead, the 
Supreme Court reaffirmed and made more explicit that 
Chevron deference recognizes Congress’s intent to delegate 
gap-filling power to agencies.  National Cable & Telecomms. 
Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Services, 545 U.S. 967, 980 (2005) 
(“Chevron . . . held that ambiguities in statutes within an 
agency’s jurisdiction to administer are delegations of 
authority to the agency to fill the statutory gap in reasonable 
fashion.”); see also Peter L. Strauss, “Deference” Is Too 
Confusing—Let’s Call Them “Chevron Space” and 
“Skidmore Weight,” 112 Colum. L. Rev. 1143, 1145 (2012) 
(“‘Chevron space’ denotes the area within which an 
administrative agency has been statutorily empowered to act 
in a manner that creates legal obligations or constraints—that 
is, its delegated or allocated authority.”). 
Whether an interpretation falls within the scope of 
authority that Congress has delegated is for the courts to 
decide at Step One because “[t]he fact that Congress has left a 
gap for the agency to fill means that courts should defer to the 
agency’s reasonable gap-filling decisions, not that courts 
should cease to mark the bounds of delegated agency choice.”  
Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511, 531 (2009) (Stevens, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also Util. Air 
Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2442 (2014) (“Even 
under Chevron’s deferential framework, agencies must 
operate within the bounds of reasonable interpretation.” 
(internal quotation marks omitted)); MCI Telecomms. Corp. 
v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 512 U.S. 218, 229 (1994) (“[A]n 
agency’s interpretation of a statute is not entitled to deference 
when it goes beyond the meaning that the statute can bear.”); 
Peter L. Strauss et al., Gellhorn & Byse’s Administrative Law 
1073 (11th ed. 2011) (“Chevron said that within the possible 
meanings of a statute, a reviewing court should accept any 
reasonable meaning given by the agency.  As the MCI case 
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[which never reached Step Two, 512 U.S. at 229] emphasizes, 
what the reasonable meanings might be is, within the 
Chevron universe, a question for the courts to decide.”).   
When the agency interpretation faithfully fills the gap 
that Congress created, we move to Step Two, where we do 
not ask whether it is the best possible interpretation of 
Congress’s ambiguous language.  Instead, we extend 
considerable deference to the agency and inquire only 
whether it made “a reasonable policy choice” in reaching its 
interpretation.  Brand X, 545 U.S. at 986. 
With the above framework in mind, we proceed to 
Step One.  
B. Chevron Step One 
To repeat, before us is whether in calculating and 
expressing a “total maximum daily load,” 33 U.S.C. 
§ 1313(d)(1)(C), the EPA may include (1) allocations of 
pollution levels among different kinds of sources, (2) a 
timeframe for complying with the TMDL’s requirements, and 
(3) assurance from the states that will implement the TMDL.  
Farm Bureau concludes that the statute unambiguously 
forecloses the EPA’s interpretation and hence the agency is 
not entitled to deference.  Several considerations persuade us 
otherwise. 
  1. Case Law on TMDLs 
The District Court noted that it was a question of first 
impression whether a TMDL could include more than a 
quantity of a pollutant.  Am. Farm Bureau Fed’n v. EPA, 984 
F. Supp. 2d 289, 316–18 (M.D. Pa. 2013).  Since its decision, 
there has been no development in the case law on that point.  
However, we do not write on a completely blank slate.  As 
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the District Court also observed, many circuit and district 
courts have defined TMDLs to accord with the EPA’s 
regulations (implying they did not present a problem).  E.g., 
Upper Blackstone Water Pollution Abatement Dist. v. EPA, 
690 F.3d 9, 14 n.8 (1st Cir. 2012); Thomas v. Jackson, 581 
F.3d 658, 662 (8th Cir. 2009); Friends of Earth v. EPA, 333 
F.3d 184, 186 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 2003); Sierra Club v. Meiburg, 
296 F.3d 1021,  1025 (11th Cir. 2002); Hayes v. Whitman, 
264 F.3d 1017, 1021 n.2 (10th Cir. 2001); 
Dioxin/Organochlorine Ctr. v. Clarke, 57 F.3d 1517, 1520 
(9th Cir. 1995).  If Farm Bureau were correct that the statute 
unambiguously supports its reading, we would expect one of 
the judges who has presided over TMDL litigation to have 
noticed the disconnect between the statute and the regulation, 
but there has been none. 
Additionally, in response to challenges from both 
environmental and industry groups, courts have recognized 
the EPA’s authority to fill the Clean Water Act’s considerable 
gaps on how to promulgate a “total maximum daily load.”  
Pronsolino, 291 F.3d at 1131 (“[T]he EPA has the delegated 
authority to enact regulations carrying the force of law 
regarding the identification of § 303(d)(1) waters and 
TMDLs.”); NRDC v. Muszynski, 268 F.3d 91, 98–99 (2d Cir. 
2001) (“We are not prepared to say Congress intended that 
such far-ranging agency expertise be narrowly confined in 
application to regulation of pollutant loads on a strictly daily 
basis. . . .  Accordingly, we agree with [the] EPA that a ‘total 
maximum daily load’ may be expressed by another measure 
of mass per time.”); Anacostia Riverkeeper, Inc. v. Jackson, 
798 F. Supp. 2d 210, 245 (D.D.C. 2011) (“[T]he [Clean 
Water Act]’s references to water quality standards require 
only that a TMDL set load levels ‘necessary to attain and 
maintain applicable water quality standards,’ 33 U.S.C. § 
1313(d)(1)(C), and do[] not otherwise refer to any particular 
timeframe. . . .  In light of the CWA’s silence on whether 
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applicable criteria must be achieved at all times or may be 
periodically violated, the Court looks to whether [the] EPA 
has reasonably resolved the issue.”).   
The only time a court has considered an aspect of the 
phrase “total maximum daily load” unambiguous was in 
response to a challenge to the EPA’s practice of promulgating 
total maximum seasonal or annual loads.  The D.C. Circuit 
held that the word “daily” was unambiguous, though it did 
not consider the above phrase unambiguous in all respects.  
Friends of Earth, Inc. v. EPA, 446 F.3d 140, 144 (D.C. Cir. 
2006).  The Second Circuit disagrees with the D.C. Circuit on 
this point, Muszynski, 268 F.3d at 98–99, and even after 
Friends of Earth the District of D.C. has allowed the EPA to 
issue total maximum annual or seasonal loads in addition to 
daily loads because, although the statute is explicit about the 
requirement for a daily load, it is silent on whether another 
timeframe may be used when that would be more appropriate 
for the particular pollutant at issue.  Anacostia Riverkeeper, 
798 F. Supp. 2d at 245. 
Turning from the specific statutory language in this 
case, the Supreme Court has held that Chevron deference is 
appropriate where an agency is charged with administering a 
complex statutory scheme requiring technical or scientific 
sophistication.  Brand X, 545 U.S. at 1002–03; Nat’l Cable & 
Telecomms. Ass’n, Inc. v. Gulf Power Co., 534 U.S. 327, 339 
(2002) (“As it was in Chevron, the subject matter here is 
technical, complex, and dynamic. . . .” (citation omitted)).  
There is no doubt that the Clean Water Act falls into this 
category of legislation.  See, e.g., United States v. Riverside 
Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 132–33 (1985) (“[The 
Act] constituted a comprehensive legislative attempt to 
restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological 
integrity of the Nation’s waters.  This objective incorporated 
a broad, systemic view of the goal of maintaining and 
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improving water quality.” (internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted)).  Moreover, Congress’s delegations to the 
EPA under the Clean Water Act are not limited to occasional 
ambiguous words; instead, Congress granted broad regulatory 
authority to the EPA, charging that, “[e]xcept as otherwise 
expressly provided in this chapter, the Administrator of the 
[EPA] . . . shall administer this chapter.”  33 U.S.C. § 
1251(d). 
Mindful of agencies’ considerable power under 
complex statutory regimes like the Clean Water Act, coupled 
with courts’ consistent determinations that “total maximum 
daily load” is ambiguous (except—though there is a split of 
authority on the point—the word “daily”) and the fact that no 
court has adverted to any problem with the EPA’s regulatory 
interpretation of the phrase, we turn to the text of the TMDL 
provision. 
2. Statutory Text 
Farm Bureau’s strongest argument is that Congress 
specifically authorized the EPA to publish “total maximum 
daily load[s] . . . at a level necessary to implement the 
applicable water quality standards . . . .”  33 U.S.C. 
§ 1313(d)(1)(C) (emphases added).  Under Farm Bureau’s 
reading, a “total load” is just a number, like the “total” at the 
bottom of a restaurant receipt.  This ordinary understanding 
of the word “total” is supported, the argument continues, 
because the load is to be established at a “level,” which can 
be high or low (so long as it is necessary to implement the 
water quality standards); in any event it should not be 
expressed as a comprehensive framework, and in no event 
can a TMDL include allocations among point and nonpoint 
sources, deadlines, and the reasonable assurance requirement. 
35 
 
This argument has some intuitive appeal, but other 
readings are possible.  Our most significant textual concern is 
that Farm Bureau’s analysis makes the word “total” 
redundant.  “Maximum daily load[s] . . . . established at a 
level necessary to implement the applicable water standard” 
would mean the same thing that Farm Bureau argues “total 
maximum daily load” means: a number set at a level needed 
to alleviate water pollution.  Applying the canon against 
surplusage, a plausible understanding of “total” is that it 
means the sum of the constituent parts of the load.  The load 
is still set at the level necessary to fight pollutants, but it is 
expressed in terms of a total of the different relevant 
allocations. 
Other uses of “total” in the Clean Water Act support 
this reading.  For example, in a section relating to the EPA’s 
power to grant funds to publicly owned treatment works, the 
agency must consider “the total cost of operation and 
maintenance of such works by each user class (taking into 
account total waste water loading of such works, the 
constituent elements of the wastes, and other appropriate 
factors).”  33 U.S.C. § 1284(b)(1) (emphasis added).  
Admittedly, the explicit listings of factors in calculating the 
“total cost” under § 1284 distinguishes that use of “total” 
from the language in § 1313, yet it indicates that Congress 
does use the word to mean something more than a single 
number.  See also id. § 1284(b)(4) (requiring “applicant to 
establish a procedure under which the residential user will be 
notified as to that portion of his total payment which will be 
allocated to the cost of the waste treatment services.” 
(emphases added)).  Another law relating to our Nation’s 
waters requires the EPA to consider “the total quantity of 
commerce supported by” a given body of water.  Id. 
§ 2238(d)(1)(C)(i) (Water Resources Reform and 
Development Act of 2014, P.L. 113-121 § 2102).  It is 
unclear how “commerce” can be expressed as a number, and 
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we surmise that “total” in that context allows the EPA to 
consider and express a complex mix of activities that affect 
its judgment. 
Additionally, although Congress explicitly required the 
EPA to establish “total maximum daily loads,” it nowhere 
prescribed how the EPA is to do so.  The agency has chosen 
to lay out in detail (1) how and why it arrived at the number it 
chose; (2) how it thinks it and affected jurisdictions will be 
able to achieve that number; (3) why that number is 
“necessary to implement the applicable water quality 
standard[],” id. § 1313(d)(1)(C); (4) when it expects the 
TMDL to achieve the applicable water quality standard; and 
(5) what it will do if the water quality standard is not met.  As 
the EPA has chosen to use notice-and-comment rulemaking 
to promulgate TMDLs, the APA likely requires the EPA to 
provide sufficient information in connection with the TMDL 
for the public adequately to comment on the agency’s 
judgment and to make suggestions where appropriate.  
Cement Kiln Recycling Coal. v. EPA, 493 F.3d 207, 225 
(D.C. Cir. 2007) (“A notice of proposed rulemaking must 
provide sufficient factual detail and rationale for the rule to 
permit interested parties to comment meaningfully.” (internal 
quotation marks and citations omitted)).  The EPA would fall 
afoul of this requirement if it published only a number with 
no supporting information, as the public would be unable to 
comment on the number without knowing whether or how the 
EPA thought such a level of discharged pollutant could be 
achieved.   
The EPA’s approach also fits the statute’s requirement 
that the load be established in light of “seasonal variations 
and a margin of safety which takes into account any lack of 
knowledge concerning the relationship between effluent 
limitations and water quality.”  33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(1)(C).  
Under Farm Bureau’s approach, these factors that affect the 
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EPA’s calculation would need to remain absent from the 
TMDL.  It would be strange to require the EPA to take into 
account these specific considerations but at the same time 
command the agency to excise them from its final product.  If 
anything, the requirements that the TMDL (1) be established 
at a level necessary to implement water quality standards, 
with (2) seasonal variations, and (3) a margin of safety that 
takes into account (4) any lack of knowledge concerning the 
relationship between effluent limitations and water quality, 
taken together, tend to suggest that “total maximum daily 
load” is a term of art meant to be fleshed out by regulation, 
and certainly something more than a number. 
Farm Bureau’s textual argument at Step One fails to 
persuade us that Congress excluded everything other than the 
sum of pollutants from a TMDL.  Congress was ambiguous 
on the content of the words “total maximum daily load”: they 
are not defined in the statute, and “total” is susceptible to 
multiple interpretations.   Furthermore, the Clean Water Act 
includes certain substantive requirements that expand the 
scope of a TMDL beyond a mere number.  It is silent on how 
the EPA must set the loads, and the APA requires the EPA to 
provide information about how it arrived at its conclusion.  
These factors suggest that Congress wanted an expert to give 
meaning to the words it chose, and, as we explain below, we 
believe the EPA’s interpretation falls within the gap created 
by Congress.  
3. Statutory Structure and Purpose 
Turning from the text of the provision, we consider the 
structure and purpose of the Clean Water Act.  Broadly 
speaking, it “anticipates a partnership between the States and 
the Federal Government, animated by a shared objective: ‘to 
restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological 
integrity of the Nation’s waters.’ 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a).”  
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Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91, 101 (1992).  This goal 
informs our understanding that “total maximum daily load” is 
broad enough to include allocations, target dates, and 
reasonable assurance. 
i. Allocations Between Point and  
    Nonpoint Sources 
As noted, the Act assigns the primary responsibility for 
regulating point sources to the EPA and nonpoint sources to 
the states.  The EPA sets limits on pollution that may come 
from point sources via a permitting process (which can be 
delegated to the states) known as the National Pollutant 
Discharge Elimination System.  33 U.S.C. § 1342.  
Nonetheless, in drafting a TMDL the Clean Water Act 
unambiguously requires the author (here, the EPA) to take 
into account nonpoint sources (though whether those sources 
must be expressed is not obvious).  This conclusion follows 
when we consider the steps that precede and culminate in a 
TMDL.  
1. Each state5 must designate a use for each body 
of water within its borders and set a target water quality based 
on that use.  33 U.S.C. § 1313 (c)(1) & (2).  The state must 
then enact “water quality standards” pursuant to state law.  Id. 
§ 1313(a) & (b). 
2. In order to meet water quality standards, the 
EPA (or the states to which the EPA has delegated this 
responsibility) sets “effluent limitations,” which are pollution 
limits on point sources. Id. §§ 1311(b)(1)(A) & 1362(11). 
                                              
5 If a state does not comply with any of the requirements 
outlined in this list, responsibility shifts to the EPA. 
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3. States must submit to the EPA a list of the 
waters within their boundaries for which effluent limitations 
(a.k.a. point-source pollution limits) are, by themselves, 
inadequate to attain the applicable water quality standard—
i.e., those waters for which both point source and nonpoint 
source limitations will be necessary.  Id. § 1313(d).  
4. It is only for these waters, for which point 
source effluent limitations alone are insufficient, that a state 
must establish a TMDL.   
5. TMDLs set the maximum amount of pollution a 
water body can absorb before violating applicable water 
quality standards.  In the statutory context noted above, it is 
impossible to meet those standards by point-source reductions 
alone.  Therefore, the Clean Water Act requires the drafter of 
a TMDL to consider nonpoint-source pollution. 
“As should be apparent, TMDLs are central to the 
Clean Water Act’s water-quality scheme because . . . they tie 
together point-source and nonpoint-source pollution issues in 
a manner that addresses the whole health of the water.”  
Meiburg, 296 F.3d at 1025 (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  As far as allocations are concerned, the EPA’s 
construction of the TMDL requirement comports well with 
the Clean Water Act’s structure and purpose.  Specifically 
allocating the pollution load between point sources (primarily 
the EPA’s responsibility) and nonpoint sources (the states’ 
dominion) is a commonsense first step to achieve the target 
water quality.  See Wenig, How “Total,” 12 Tul. Envtl. L.J. 
at 150 (“Ideally, all ecosystem harms should be subject to 
numerical loading and allocation calculations to maximize 
TMDLs’ value of providing the ‘technical backbone’ or 
‘blueprint’ for a watershed approach.”). 
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Because TMDLs only relate to bodies of water for 
which point source limitations are insufficient, they must take 
into account pollution from both point and nonpoint sources.  
We believe the congressional silence on how to promulgate a 
TMDL and the congressional command that a TMDL be 
established only for waters that cannot be cleaned by point-
source limitations alone (necessarily implying that, whatever 
form the TMDL takes, it must incorporate nonpoint source 
limitations) combine to authorize the EPA to express load and 
waste load allocations.  To be sure, the statute does not 
command the EPA’s final regulation to allocate explicitly 
parts of a load among different kinds of sources, but we agree 
with the EPA that it may do so. 
ii. “Deadlines” or “Target Dates” 
Similarly, it is common sense that a timeline 
complements the Clean Water Act’s requirement that all 
impaired waters achieve applicable water quality standards.  
The amount of acceptable pollution in a body of water is 
necessarily tied to the date at which the EPA and the states 
believe the water should meet its quality standard; if the 
target date is 100 years from now, more pollution per day will 
be allowable than if the target date is five years from now.  
Additionally, any meaningful pollution-reduction plan needs 
to take into account the dynamic nature of watersheds, 
particularly the fact that they change over time.  Robert W. 
Adler, Addressing Barriers to Watershed Protection, 25 
Envtl. L. 973, 982 (1995) (“[R]iver systems are four-
dimensional in nature: 1) longitudinal (upstream-
downstream); 2) lateral (floodplain-uplands); 3) vertical 
(groundwater-surface water); and 4) temporal (all three 
spatial dimensions change over time).”).  As promulgating an 
accurate TMDL—that is, one that states a pollutant load 
“necessary to implement the applicable water quality 
standards,” 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(1)(C)—requires 
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consideration of a timeline and of changes over time, it is 
more consistent with the purpose of the Clean Water Act to 
express the deadline that the EPA relied on in calculating the 
TMDL than to make states and the public guess what it is. 
iii. Reasonable Assurance 
Farm Bureau’s argument that the Act forbids the EPA 
from seeking reasonable assurance from the states that their 
Watershed Improvement Plans will meet their stated goals is 
also inconsistent with the purpose and structure of the Clean 
Water Act.  The TMDL must be set “at a level necessary to 
implement the applicable water quality standards.”  33 U.S.C. 
§ 1313(d)(1)(C).  The EPA chose to set the TMDL with 
substantial input from the states but, in order to comply with 
the Clean Water Act and the APA, the EPA would not blindly 
accept states’ submissions.  Instead it decided to satisfy itself 
that the states’ proposals would actually “implement the 
applicable water quality standards.”  Id.  This requirement 
made sure that the EPA could exercise “reasoned judgment” 
in evaluating the states’ proposed standards and was thus 
consistent with the Clean Water Act.  Ctr. for Biological 
Diversity v. EPA, 749 F.3d 1079, 1087 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
iv. Summary of Structure and 
Purpose 
The point of the TMDL is to take into consideration 
nonpoint-source pollution; no meaningful decision about 
limiting pollution can be made without specifying a time 
frame within which pollution is to be eliminated; and the 
Clean Water Act envisions assurance of effective pollution 
controls.  Preventing the EPA from expressing allocations and 
timelines and from obtaining reasonable assurance from 
affected states appears to frustrate those goals, and thus the 
phrase “total maximum daily load” has enough play in the 
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joints to allow the EPA to consider and express these factors 
in its final action. 
4. Avoidance Canons 
Farm Bureau counters that the Chesapeake Bay TMDL 
intrudes on land use, an area traditionally regulated by states.  
It contends that we should not accept the EPA’s construction 
of the words “total maximum daily load” without a clear 
statement that Congress intended federal involvement in this 
realm of state policymaking.   
This argument requires us to consider Chevron’s 
interaction with two canons of statutory construction—
constitutional avoidance and the related “federalism canon” 
that “Congress does not readily interfere” with states’ 
“substantial sovereign powers under our constitutional 
scheme.”  Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 461 (1991).   
How and even whether to apply these canons during a 
Chevron analysis has been a matter of debate in both the 
judiciary and academia.  Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 
715, 737–38 (2006) (plurality opinion) (rejecting agency 
interpretation that would impinge on “the States’ traditional 
and primary power over land and water use”); id. at 757–58 
(Roberts, C.J., concurring) (implying agency interpretation 
would have been upheld had it been promulgated through 
notice-and-comment rulemaking); id. at 776–77 (Kennedy, J., 
concurring in the judgment) (rejecting plurality’s “federalism 
concerns”); id. at 803 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The two 
canons of construction [federalism and constitutional 
avoidance] relied on by the plurality . . . fail to overcome the 
deference owed to the Corps.”); Kenneth A. Bamberger, 
Normative Canons in the Review of Administrative 
Policymaking, 118 Yale L.J. 64, 118 (2008) (suggesting 
federalism canon could be applied at Chevron Step Two); 
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Scott A. Keller, How Courts Can Protect State Autonomy 
from Federal Administrative Encroachment, 82 S. Cal. L. 
Rev. 45, 81–91 (2008) (arguing that courts should apply the 
federalism canon whenever an agency interpretation 
encroaches on state autonomy); Abbe R. Gluck, Intersystemic 
Statutory Interpretation: Methodology as “Law” and the Erie 
Doctrine, 120 Yale L.J. 1898, 1987–89 (2011) (arguing that 
Supreme Court should (but does not) give stare decisis effect 
to interpretive methodologies, including federalism canon); 
Strauss et al., Administrative Law 1091 (questioning 
existence of federalism canon).   
We think the two interpretive canons can be used—
like all “traditional tools of statutory construction,” Chevron, 
467 U.S. at 843 n.9—at the Step One stage of defining the 
scope of a congressional delegation in light of an agency’s 
actual interpretation.  Put another way, they may be of use as 
we consider whether an agency’s interpretation falls within a 
gap Congress has authorized an agency to fill.  We begin with 
federalism. 
i. Federalism 
The two most factually on-point cases that consider the 
federalism canon are Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cnty. v. 
Army Corps of Eng’rs (SWANCC), 531 U.S. 159 (2001), and 
Rapanos, 547 U.S. 715.  In both cases, the Army Corps of 
Engineers asserted the authority to regulate—i.e., 
“jurisdiction” in the administrative law sense of the word—
certain geographical areas as “waters of the United States.”  
There was debate among the Supreme Court’s justices about 
how wet these areas were, but for our purposes it suffices to 
say that you could not float a ship on them.  In those cases, 
Congress’s intent to alter the traditional federal-state balance 
was doubtful, as it was unclear whether the Corps even had 
jurisdiction over the areas at issue.  The Court in SWANCC 
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and a plurality in Rapanos were unwilling to accept the 
Corps’ assertion of jurisdiction over what looked like places 
traditionally regulated by the states.   
In our case, however, jurisdiction over the Chesapeake 
Bay is not at issue.  The question is far finer grained: what is 
a “total maximum daily load”?  Even if the consequences of 
defining the terms of the statute as the EPA has done intrudes 
more significantly on certain state prerogatives than Farm 
Bureau’s proposal, we already know that the term “total 
maximum daily load” exists within a cooperative federalism 
framework and that the area being regulated is clearly within 
the agency’s jurisdiction.  In this context, requiring another 
“clear statement” of congressional intent for every ambiguous 
term in a highly technical statute, before accepting an 
interpretation that could affect our federal structure, would 
defeat one of the central virtues of the Chevron framework: 
Congress may leave interstitial details to expert agencies and 
need not think through at the drafting stage every possible 
permutation of agencies’ plausible future interpretations.  To 
use the Supreme Court’s language disposing of a similar 
argument (in a different regulatory context), the TMDL 
provision “explicitly supplants state authority by requiring” 
states to participate in pollution-reduction programs by, in 
part, submitting a TMDL, “and the meaning of that phrase 
[here, total maximum daily load] is indisputably a question of 
federal law.”  City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1873 
(2013).  Nor can we say that defining “loads” of pollution as 
allocated among different sources or expressed as a single 
number is a matter of regulation traditionally reserved to the 
states.  Thus, to the extent the TMDL may affect land-use 
decisions, we do not see that as foreclosing the EPA’s 
interpretation. 
Perhaps we would reach a different result if the TMDL 
in fact made land-use decisions diminishing state authority in 
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a significant way; we might then say that Congress delegated 
some authority over the definitions of technical terms in the 
Clean Water Act but not so much discretion as to usurp 
states’ zoning powers.  Indeed, the heart of Farm Bureau’s 
federalism argument is that the TMDL impermissibly grants 
the EPA the authority to make land-use and zoning 
regulations.  The challenge is long on swagger but short on 
specificity.  That is likely because the TMDL’s provisions 
that could be read to affect land use are either explicitly 
allowed by federal law or too generalized to supplant state 
zoning powers in any extraordinary way.   
The TMDL comes closest to dictating a land-use 
regulation by allocating pollution limits to specific point 
sources.  See Appendix R.  As each of these sources is 
regulated by the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination 
System, see 33 U.S.C. § 1342, and the TMDL’s allocations 
are not alleged to be inconsistent with that scheme, these 
waste load allocations do not trespass onto an area of 
traditional state regulation to some greater degree than the 
Clean Water Act anticipates.   
The next most intrusive aspect of the TMDL is its 
allocations of limits to nonpoint-source sectors, as opposed to 
specific sources.  The TMDL prescribes 
daily Land Based [Load Allocation]s for 
specific nonpoint source sectors: agriculture, 
forest, nontidal atmospheric deposition, onsite 
septic, and urban.  Land Based [Load 
Allocations] are presented as delivered load for 
each of the 92 impaired segments by 
jurisdiction and by nonpoint source sector for 
[total nitrogen, total phosphorous, and total 
suspended solids]. 
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J.A. 1597 (emphases added); see also TMDL Appendix R.  In 
presenting load allocations by sector, the TMDL gives the 
states flexibility in achieving the limits the EPA set—
preserving state autonomy in land-use and zoning. 
Further undermining the claim that the TMDL 
impermissibly takes over state power to regulate land is that 
the TMDL nowhere prescribes any particular means of 
pollution reduction to any individual point or nonpoint 
source.  Instead, it contains pollution limits and allocations to 
be used as an informational tool used in connection with a 
state’s efforts to regulate water pollution.  This conclusion is 
confirmed by the Act, as it requires states to have a 
“continuing planning process,” which must include (but is not 
limited to) “total maximum daily load[s].”  33 U.S.C. 
§ 1313(e)(1) & (3).  It is further confirmed by the language of 
the TMDL, which provides that “[t]he cornerstone of the 
accountability framework is the jurisdictions’ development of 
[Watershed Improvement Plans], which serve as roadmaps 
for how and when a jurisdiction plans to meet its pollutant 
allocations under the TMDL,” J.A. 1113, and by the EPA’s 
repeated concessions that it will not undertake any 
enforcement action under the TMDL.  Tr. of Oral Argument 
at 91:3, Oct. 4, 2012, American Farm Bureau Fed’n v. EPA, 
No. 11-cv-67 (M.D. Pa.), J.A. 1758; EPA Response Br. at 23. 
Farm Bureau characterizes the TMDL as more than an 
informational tool by pointing to incentives for states to 
implement it.  By virtue of 33 U.SC. § 1313(e), the TMDL 
must be included in each state’s “continuing planning 
process,” something the states are ostensibly required to put 
in place.6  The sanction for failing to adopt an adequate 
                                              
6 From the record before us, it is not clear that any 
Chesapeake Bay state has or will adopt a continuing planning 
process within the meaning of § 1313(e), or that such a 
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continuing planning process under § 1313(e) is that the state 
loses its authority to administer its portion of the National 
Pollution Discharge Elimination System.  33 U.S.C. 
§ 1313(e)(2).  Another means of incentivizing states to follow 
the TMDL involves overseeing their implementation of 
Watershed Improvement Plans.  “If progress is insufficient, 
EPA will utilize contingencies to place additional controls on 
federally permitted sources of pollution . . . as well as target 
compliance and enforcement activities.”  J.A. 1118.  The EPA 
lays out in more detail what these compliance and 
enforcement activities may be in Section 7.2.4 of the TMDL; 
they include establishing finer-scale waste load allocations 
and load allocations (i.e., more tightly overseeing states’ 
pollution control) and conditioning federal grants  based on 
progress in implementing the Watershed Improvement Plans 
(i.e., withholding money if progress is unsatisfactory).  The 
allocations are not self-executing, and all the other 
enforcement actions concern administration of federal 
programs plainly within the EPA’s authority. 
Despite these incentives, Farm Bureau does not argue 
that the “inducement offered by Congress” for the states to 
adopt and enforce the TMDL is “so coercive as to pass the 
point at which pressure turns into compulsion.” South Dakota 
v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211 (1987) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  Because Farm Bureau does not say that the EPA 
coerced the states into accepting the TMDL and because it 
only obliquely affects land use regulations, we conclude that 
                                                                                                     
process will include the TMDL, but the states’ Phase II 
Watershed Improvement Plans, which are to be implemented 
now that the TMDL has been published, may satisfy the 
statute’s requirements. 
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the TMDL does not prescribe land use rules that excessively 
intrude on traditional state authority. 
Put another way, it is illogical to assert that the EPA 
usurps states’ traditional land-use authority when it (1) makes 
no actual, identifiable, land-use rule and (2) proposes 
regulatory actions that are specifically allowed under federal 
law.  Hence we fail to see how this case presents federalism 
concerns so significant as to require a “clear statement” from 
Congress called for in SWANCC before we prohibit the 
EPA’s interpretation of the statute.  When a statutory scheme 
clearly inserts the federal Government into an area of typical 
state authority, we may require a plain statement from 
Congress about the scope of the statute’s applicability before 
upholding an agency’s assertion of jurisdiction over an area 
(physical or legal) historically regulated by the states.  But, as 
here, once an agency is operating in the weeds of a statute 
that obviously requires federal oversight of some state 
functions, we will not require subordinate clear statements of 
congressional intent every time an interpretation arguably 
varies the usual balance of responsibilities between federal 
and state sovereigns.   
We add an important caveat: if an agency interprets a 
statute in a way that pushes a constitutional boundary 
(whether that boundary comes from the federal structure or a 
different constitutional principle), we may find that 
interpretation outside the scope of Congress’s delegation if it 
does not clearly flow from the statutory text.  That brings us 
to the next question.  Does the EPA’s interpretation of “total 
maximum daily load” push at the Constitution’s outer 
bounds? 
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ii. Constitutional Avoidance 
When the TMDL is implemented, some land will need 
to be used differently from the way it is now, and it is true 
that land use law is an area typically within the states’ police 
power.  At the same time, federal power over interstate 
waterways, “from the commencement of the [federal] 
government, has been exercised with the consent of all, and 
has been understood by all to be a commercial regulation.”  
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 1, 190 (1824).  And for 
at least a century, federal common law has governed disputes 
over interstate water pollution.  Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 
U.S. at 98 (citing Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496 (1906), 
and Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907)).   
Regulation of the channels of interstate commerce lies 
at the very core of Congress’s commerce power.  E.g., United 
States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558 (1995) (“[W]e have 
identified three broad categories of activity that Congress 
may regulate under its commerce power. First, Congress may 
regulate the use of the channels of interstate commerce.” 
(citations omitted)); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. U.S., 379 
U.S. 241, 256 (1964) (“[T]he authority of Congress to keep 
the channels of interstate commerce free from immoral and 
injurious uses has been frequently sustained, and is no longer 
open to question.”).  And there can be no serious question that 
the Chesapeake Bay is a channel of interstate commerce: it 
produces 500 million pounds of seafood per year, leads ships 
to many port towns (including Baltimore), and has an 
estimated economic value of more than one trillion dollars.  
EPA Response Br. at 4.  Broadly speaking, then, the federal 
Government’s traditional authority to regulate this part of the 
country is secure.   
By contrast, in Clean Water Act cases where there 
were arguable Commerce Clause problems, the SWANCC 
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Court would not interpret the Act to confer federal 
jurisdiction over an abandoned, man-made sand and gravel pit 
absent a “clear statement” from Congress to that effect 
because such an interpretation raised serious constitutional 
concerns (that the Government had failed to identify an 
activity that substantially affected interstate commerce, 531 
U.S. at 173), and the Rapanos plurality rejected the Corps’ 
interpretation of the “waters of the United States” to include 
wetlands near ditches that eventually drain into navigable 
waters because that understanding “presses the envelope of 
constitutional validity.” 547 U.S. at 738.   
Moreover, in Rapanos it appears five justices had no 
constitutional concerns in any event.  Justice Kennedy, who 
provided the fifth vote to vacate the Sixth Circuit’s judgment, 
concluded only that the Court of Appeals had not faithfully 
applied SWANCC.  Id. at 759.  He forcefully rejected the 
plurality’s reasoning, id. at 776 (“[T]he plurality’s opinion is 
inconsistent with the Act’s text, structure, and purpose.”), and 
asserted a broad theory of federal authority under the 
Commerce Clause: 
Even assuming, then, that federal regulation of remote 
wetlands and nonnavigable waterways would raise a 
difficult Commerce Clause issue notwithstanding those 
waters’ aggregate effects on national water quality, but 
cf. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942); see also 
infra, at 2249–2250 [citing Justice Stevens’s dissent], 
the plurality’s reading is not responsive to this 
concern. As for States’ “responsibilities and rights,” 
[33 U.S.C.] § 1251(b), it is noteworthy that 33 States 
plus the District of Columbia have filed an amici brief 
in this litigation asserting that the Clean Water Act is 
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important to their own water policies.[7] These amici 
note, among other things, that the Act protects 
downstream States from out-of-state pollution that 
they cannot themselves regulate.  
Id at 777.  Justice Stevens and the three other dissenters who 
joined him would have held that it was reasonable and 
                                              
7 We recognize that private parties may rely on the 
Constitution’s structural division of labor between states and 
the federal Government to argue that one has gone too far.  
See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 654 (2000) 
(Souter, J. dissenting) (“Thirty-six [states] and the 
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico have filed an amicus brief in 
support of petitioners in these cases, and only one State has 
taken respondents’ side. It is, then, not the least irony of these 
cases that the States will be forced to enjoy the new 
federalism whether they want it or not.”).  And in any event 
the rooting interests of the states (both those directly affected 
by the TMDL and others) are not one-sided here.  None of the 
seven states within the Chesapeake Bay’s watershed sued the 
EPA over this TMDL.  Virginia, Maryland, Delaware, and the 
District of Columbia have filed briefs in support of the 
District Court’s decision, while West Virginia has signed on 
to the amici brief of states that oppose the EPA’s decision.  
The other states (Pennsylvania and New York) are on the 
sidelines, but local governments are involved: municipalities 
from both states have filed amici briefs in favor of the EPA; 
on the other hand, six Pennsylvania counties and one 
Delaware county have filed a brief in support of Farm 
Bureau.  Last, 21 other states have filed an amici brief in 
support of Farm Bureau, relying primarily on federalism 
arguments.   
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constitutional for the Corps to include within the definition of 
“waters of the United States” wetlands that drain into 
navigable waters.  Id. at 788. 
Notwithstanding the constitutional concerns raised in 
those cases, SWANCC and Rapanos are easily distinguishable 
on the critical and obvious ground that we are not concerned 
here with a small intrastate area of wetland; we are dealing 
with North America’s largest estuary.  Indeed, the Rapanos 
plurality approvingly quoted a previous case for the 
proposition that “‘[i]n view of the breadth of federal 
regulatory authority contemplated by the Act itself and the 
inherent difficulties of defining precise bounds to regulable 
waters, the Corps’ ecological judgment about the relationship 
between waters and their adjacent wetlands provides an 
adequate basis for a legal judgment that adjacent wetlands 
may be defined as waters under the Act.’”  Id. at 740–41 
(quoting United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 
U.S. 121, 134 (1985) (emphasis in Rapanos)).  It is beyond 
debate that navigable-in-fact waters are regulable and that the 
Chesapeake Bay is navagible-in-fact.  SWANCC and Rapanos 
are also distinguishable because no one here is challenging 
the EPA’s authority to set a total maximum daily load; rather, 
Farm Bureau challenges how the EPA is allowed to express 
the load and what it may consider in drafting the TMDL.  
And, although Justice Kennedy’s concurrence is Delphic on 
this point, it appears that in Rapanos five Justices had no 
constitutional concerns.  For us, the key point is that, in terms 
of the conflict between state and federal regulatory authority, 
we are far removed from SWANCC and Rapanos. 
Because the TMDL forms part of a plan to clean up a 
channel of interstate commerce, we have no constitutional 
concerns with the EPA’s interpretation of the statute. 
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 5. Conclusion With Respect to Step  
    One 
 “Total” is susceptible to multiple meanings.  
Interpreting “total maximum daily load” as requiring one 
number and nothing more is in tight tension with the Clean 
Water Act’s goal of providing a cooperative framework for 
states and the federal Government to work together to 
eliminate water pollution.  The Act’s structure supports that 
TMDLs need to account for point and nonpoint sources, but 
the Act is silent on how to account for those sources.  It is 
also silent on (1) whether the EPA in calculating a TMDL 
may consider and express the time frames within which it and 
the states will strive to achieve water quality standards and 
(2) the extent to which the EPA may consider and express 
whether a state will meet the goals it sets (the “reasonable 
assurance” requirement).  Last, the APA prefers overt rather 
than covert reasoning by agencies.  For these reasons, we 
conclude that the phrase “total maximum daily load” is 
ambiguous enough to allow the EPA to include the elements 
of the TMDL challenged here. 
D. Chevron Step Two 
We briefly summarize the reasoning from Step One 
that also supports the EPA’s Step Two argument (Farm 
Bureau merely repeats its Step One contentions at Step Two, 
so there is no need to dive too deep here).  As noted above, 
“total” can mean “a sum of parts,” and interpreting “total” 
that way gives greater guidance to states in cleaning their 
waters, provides greater transparency to the public who may 
comment on a TMDL, and furthers the Act’s requirement that 
the TMDL account for both point and nonpoint sources.  
Moreover, expressing the allocation of pollution limits 
between the EPA-regulated point sources and state-regulated 
nonpoint sources furthers the Clean Water Act’s goal of 
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achieving water quality standards.  Including deadlines in a 
TMDL furthers the Act’s goal that the TMDL promptly 
achieve something beneficial (recall that the enacting 
Congress’s goal was to have the Nation’s waters clean by 
1985), and the reasonable assurance requirement helps guide 
the EPA’s discretion in determining whether to approve a 
TMDL or a state’s mandatory “continuing planning process,” 
which must include the TMDL, 33 U.S.C. § 1313(e), as it 
would surely be arbitrary or capricious for the EPA to 
approve a plan that a state is incapable of following.   
In addition to the factors just discussed, at Step Two 
we may consider legislative history to the extent that it may 
clarify the policies framing the statute.8  And we must 
                                              
8 In United States v. Geiser, 527 F.3d 288, 294 (3d Cir. 2008), 
we wrote “that legislative history should not be considered at 
Chevron step one.”  This statement is a well-considered 
precedent of our Court, and we adhere to it here. 
 There is an argument that Geiser’s language excising 
legislative history from Step One is too broad.  It derives 
from discussions of how to construe unambiguous language.  
See id., 527 F.3d at 293 (citing Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. 89 v. 
Dep’t of Educ., 550 U.S. 81, 93 (2007); Dep’t of Hous. & 
Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125, 132–33 (2002)).  
Legislative history is generally not used to assess whether the 
words of a statute are ambiguous or to interpret unambiguous 
words.  See Milner v. Dep’t of Navy, 131 S. Ct. 1259, 1267 
(2011).  But at Step One we consider (1) whether a statute is 
ambiguous, and, if so, (2) whether the agency’s interpretation 
falls within the scope of the ambiguity and (3) whether the 
ambiguity signifies a congressional delegation.  See supra 
Part IV.A (discussing content of Chevron inquiry); United 
States v. Home Concrete & Supply, LLC, 132 S. Ct. 1836, 
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1844 (2012) (opinion of Breyer, J.) (concluding despite 
“linguistic ambiguity” that Congress had not “delegated gap-
filling power to the agency”).  Legislative history can be 
helpful in the latter inquiries.  If, for example, a committee 
report notes that Congress has left a gap for an agency to fill, 
one might question whether that would be relevant to a judge 
who considers the use of legislative history to be permissible.  
See, e.g., H.R. Rep 92-911 at 93 (“The use of the word 
‘generally’ is intended to provide the Administrator with 
some discretion . . . .”).    
 Geiser’s holding on when we may consult legislative 
history in construing statutes is arguably in tension with the 
Supreme Court’s general practice of declining to make 
interpretive methodologies binding (as academics put it, the 
Court typically avoids “methodological stare decisis”), 
particularly in the context of legislative history.  See Evan J. 
Criddle & Glen Staszewski, Against Methodological Stare 
Decisis, 102 Geo. L.J. 1573, 1576 (2014) (“[F]ederal courts 
do not treat interpretive methodology as a traditional form of 
‘law,’ and federal judges are therefore permitted to use 
whichever interpretive methods they prefer to resolve each 
particular case.”); Abbe R. Gluck, The States as Laboratories 
of Statutory Interpretation: Methodological Consensus and 
the New Modified Textualism, 119 Yale L.J. 1750, 1765 
(2010) (“Indeed, the Court does not give stare decisis effect to 
any statements of statutory interpretation methodology.” 
(emphasis in original)); Jordan Wilder Connors, Treating Like 
Subdecisions Alike: The Scope of Stare Decisis as Applied to 
Judicial Methodology, 108 Colum. L. Rev. 681, 707 (2008); 
Jonathan R. Siegel, The Polymorphic Principle and the 
Judicial Role in Statutory Interpretation, 84 Tex. L. Rev. 339, 
389 (2005); Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of 
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consider whether the agency made “‘a reasonable policy 
choice’” in its interpretation.  Brand X, 545 U.S. at 997 
(quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 845). 
Although the parties do not cite any pre-enactment 
legislative history that describes the meaning of “total 
maximum daily load,” one committee report, by the House 
Public Works Committee, commented in discussing draft 
legislation that “[a] maximum daily load shall also be 
developed by a State for all waters within its boundaries 
which are not identified as requiring more stringent effluent 
limitations to meet water quality standards. The committee 
recognizes that this is a time-consuming and difficult task.”  
H.R. Rep. No. 92-911, at 106 (1972).  This is the only 
discussion in the pre-enactment legislative history of the 
TMDL requirement, and it provides no help beyond 
recognizing that developing a TMDL is “time consuming and 
difficult.”  If anything, this undercuts the idea that a TMDL is 
just a number, but it offers only weak support at best for the 
EPA. 
Post-enactment developments are more informative.  
Specifically, in 1987, after the EPA had defined “total 
maximum daily load” as the sum of waste load allocations for 
point sources and load allocations for nonpoint sources, 
Congress added § 1313(d)(4)(A) & (B) governing the 
revision of effluent limitations “based on a total maximum 
daily load or other waste load allocation established under 
                                                                                                     
Statutory Interpretation, 115 Harv. L. Rev. 2085, 2144–45 
(2002).  However, as whether we consider legislative history 
at Step One or Step Two does not affect the outcome of this 
case, we have no occasion to explore further the contours of 
this debate.  We follow the instruction in Geiser and turn to 
the relevant legislative history at Chevron’s second step. 
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this section.”  P.L. 100-4 § 404(b) (Feb. 4, 1987) (emphasis 
added).  The word “other” suggests that a TMDL contains a 
waste load allocation.  Interestingly, § 1313 makes no 
reference to a “waste load allocation”; that phrase occurs only 
in the EPA’s regulations.  The EPA therefore has a strong 
argument that Congress not only agreed to its definition of 
TMDL as the sum of load and waste load allocations, but also 
affirmatively incorporated the EPA’s rule in an addition to the 
statute. 
A second development in 1987 was that Congress 
ratified the Chesapeake Bay Program, a voluntary partnership 
among several watershed states and the EPA.  See 33 U.S.C. 
§ 1267.  The 1987 legislation supported cleanup efforts by a 
program of grants and study; in 2000 Congress added 
§ 1267(g), which directed the EPA to “ensure that 
management plans are developed and implementation is 
begun” to meet the goals of the Chesapeake Bay Agreement.  
Although § 1267 does not add to the EPA’s regulatory 
authority, it strongly suggests that cleaning up the Bay is a 
priority for Congress and that it did not have a problem with 
the EPA’s role in developing goals for the watershed even 
though the EPA had promulgated its TMDL rules long before 
§ 1267 was added to the U.S. Code. 
Farm Bureau claims that Congress, far from 
acquiescing to the regulatory definitions of the EPA, has 
specifically rejected its “reasonable assurance” requirement 
by blocking implementation of an EPA rule in 2000.  68 Fed. 
Reg. 13,608–09 (Mar. 19, 2003).  As the EPA convincingly 
counters, the entire rule was blocked for just one year, 
contained dozens of changes to the EPA’s Clean Water Act 
regulations (which included the reasonable assurance 
requirement), and was ultimately withdrawn in its entirety in 
2003.  Farm Bureau gives no reason to think that Congress 
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blocked the rule because of the reasonable assurance 
requirement.  
Although legislative history in general and 
“congressional acquiescence” in particular are controversial 
legal methods, to the extent they have the power to persuade, 
they provide support to the EPA that it has reasonably carried 
out Congress’s directives in administering the TMDL section 
of the Clean Water Act. 
More to the point, even Farm Bureau “agree[s] with 
EPA that developing source limits, assurances, and deadlines 
is useful.”  Reply Br. at 2.  Although Farm Bureau claims that 
the Chesapeake Bay will be cleaned up without EPA 
intervention, the contention defies common sense and 
experience.  The Clean Water Act sought to eliminate water 
pollution by 1985, but by 2010 62% of the Bay had 
insufficient oxygen to support aquatic life, and only 18% of 
the Bay had acceptable water clarity.  NGO Response Br. at 
6. 
In an important article on the allocation of property 
rights in land, Robert Ellickson distinguished among small, 
medium, and large events (using, he acknowledged tongue-in-
cheek, “highly sophisticated adjectives”).  Robert C. 
Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 Yale L.J. 1315, 1325 
(1993).  “Large events,” he noted, “are inherently difficult to 
regulate.  Identifying the institutions that govern them best—
or, more bluntly, least badly—should be an exercise in 
experience, not logic.” Id. at 1335.  The drainage of 64,000 
square miles of land into the continent’s largest estuary 
qualifies as a large event, and it has proved difficult to 
regulate.  Our experience in state regulation of water 
pollution gave environmentalists poster material in the 1969 
burning of the Cuyahoga River, the consequence of a classic 
“tragedy of the commons,” which occurs when society fails to 
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create incentives to use a common resource responsibly.  See 
Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 Science 
1243, 1244 (1968).  Producers of industrial waste used the 
Cuyahoga River to diffuse oil and other chemicals—and thus 
the river “ooze[d] rather than flow[ed]” and a person who fell 
in would “not drown but decay”—until the waste caught fire.  
Time, America’s Sewage System and the Price of Optimism 
(Aug. 1, 1969).  In response to that fire and to the general 
degradation of American water that followed the post-war 
industrial boom, Congress determined that the EPA should 
have a leadership role in coordinating among states to restore 
the Nation’s waters to something approaching their natural 
state.  See 33 U.S.C. § 1251.  The EPA has carried out that 
duty by publishing approximately 61,000 TMDLs with a level 
of detail commensurate with the challenge of cleaning and 
maintaining our waters.  The EPA’s approach makes sense, as 
even Farm Bureau acknowledges, and therefore represents a 
reasonable policy choice at Chevron’s second step. 
Farm Bureau’s reading of the Act would stymie the 
EPA’s ability to coordinate among all the competing possible 
uses of the resources that affect the Bay.  At best, it would 
shift the burden of meeting water quality standards to point 
source polluters, but regulating them alone would not result in 
a clean Bay.  See supra Part IV.B.3.i (explaining how 33 
U.S.C. § 1313(d) requires “impaired waters” to be listed only 
when point source regulation is insufficient to meet water 
quality standards).  As the Supreme Court has admonished in 
the water-pollution context, “We cannot, in these 
circumstances, conclude that Congress has given authority 
inadequate to achieve with reasonable effectiveness the 
purposes for which it has acted.” E.I. Du Pont De Nemours v. 
Train, 430 U.S. 112, 132 (1977) (quoting Permian Basin 
Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 777 (1968)).  Establishing a 
comprehensive, watershed-wide TMDL—complete with 
allocations among different kinds of sources, a timetable, and 
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reasonable assurance that it will actually be implemented—is 
reasonable and reflects a legitimate policy choice by the 
agency in administering a less-than-clear statute. Therefore 
we uphold these decisions at Chevron Step Two. 
V. Conclusion 
Water pollution in the Chesapeake Bay is a complex 
problem currently affecting at least 17,000,000 people (with 
more to come).  Any solution to it will result in winners and 
losers.  To judge from the arguments and the amici briefs 
filed in this case, the winners are environmental groups, the 
states that border the Bay, tourists, fishermen, municipal 
waste water treatment works, and urban centers.  The losers 
are rural counties with farming operations, nonpoint source 
polluters, the agricultural industry, and those states that would 
prefer a lighter touch from the EPA.  Congress made a 
judgment in the Clean Water Act that the states and the EPA 
could, working together, best allocate the benefits and 
burdens of lowering pollution.  The Chesapeake Bay TMDL 
will require sacrifice by many, but that is a consequence of 
the tremendous effort it will take to restore health to the 
Bay—to make it once again a part of our “land of living,” 
Robert Frost, The Gift Outright line 10—a goal our elected 
representatives have repeatedly endorsed.  Farm Bureau’s 
arguments to the contrary are unpersuasive, and thus we 
affirm the careful and thorough opinion of the District Court. 
